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her the statutory share.2 / Unless there is a contrary preference given in the will,
the courts will generally cause the estate to be taken in the following order:
residuary intestate property, residuary legacies, general legacies, and specific
legacies. 22 All legacies abate before devises of realty.23 To the extent that it is
necessary, the members of each class must contribute pro-rata to make up the
deficiency. 24 In New York, however, the above system of abatement is not followed, instead all other beneficiaries, regardless of class, contribute in proportion
to the property received by them.2 5 Apparently the New York courts take the
view that such an adjustment will upset the testator's scheme of disposition the
least.26
At common law the devise or bequest which is relinquished by the spouse
upon election became intestate property and went to the heirs. Today, however,
the courts of equity will sequester the repudiated devise or bequest and distribute
it to the disappointed devisees and legatees. 27 Thus where a residuary legatee has
been deprived of his legacy by the election, the benefit intended for the spouse will
be sequestered to compensate him.28
KENNETH W. KELDSEN

OWNERSHIP

OF WYOMING

MINERALS

UNDER FAULTY

FEDERAL PATENTS

USED IN RAILWAY LAND GRANTS
Landowners in Wyoming holding deeds to lands patented prior to December

10, 1903 under federal land grants may be the nescient recipients of a mineral
windfall. This may be the present effect of a decision of the United States
Supreme Court delivered June 22, 1914 in the case of Burke v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Company.1
This possibility arises by virtue of the court's determination that a patent
clause reserving mineral lands was void. The clause was contained as standard
nomenclature in patents issued by the Land Department under the provisions of
the railway land grant acts, and was included from 1866 until omitted by order
21. Dunlap v. McCloud, 84 Ohio St. 272, 95 N. E. 774 (1911).
22. 3 Woerner, op. cit. supra note 16, sec. 452; 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 19, secs. 1497,
1498, 1500; Baker v. Baker, 319 Ill. 320, 150 N. E. 284, 42 A. L. R. 1514 (1925);
Ballinger's Devisees v. Ballinger's Adm'r., 251 Ky. 405, 65 S. W. (2d) 49 (1933)
Rexford v. Bacon, 195 Il. 70, 62 N. E. 936 (1902); Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142,
154 Ad. 387 (1931).

23. 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 19, sec. 1508. Page also states in the same section that by
statute in some states the devises abate pro rata with the legacies of the same class.
24. 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 19, sec. 1496; with the exception that a legacy for value

has priority over other legacies, 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 19, sec. 1501.
25. In re Byrnes Estate, supra note 8.
26. 47 Harv. L. Rev. 889.
27. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence. sec. 519 (5th ed. 1941) ; See also Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 556, 133 So. 723, 74 A. L. R. 657 (1931) ; 1 Woerner, op.
cit. supra note 16, sec. 119 at p. 406.

28. Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Company, 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N. E.
784, 99 A. L. R. 224 (1935).
1. 234 U. S. 669, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527 (1914).

NOTES
of the Secretary of the Interior after December 10, 1903.2 The clause read:
"Excluding and excepting all mineral lands should any such be found in the
tracts aforesaid, but this exclusion and exception, according to the terms of the
statute, shall not be construed to include coal and iron lands." 3 The terminology
of the clause indicates a continuing effect applying to the lands even after issue
of the patent and excepting from its operation lands ultimately ascertained to
contain minerals. The Supreme Court held that the insertion of such a provision
was beyond the power of the Land Department, that body having authority to
reserve only mineral lands known to exist as such prior to the issuance of the
patent but releasing all authority to effect the land upon issue. The effect of the
holding was to vest a general title4 in the patentee to all lands described in the
patent, in the absence of a showing of fraud in the procuring of the patent which
would create a right of action in the government to maintain suit to annul the
transfer. By the terms of an 1896 statute, suits brought by the United States to
vacate or annul any patent to lands theretofore erroneously issued under a railroad
or wagon road grant could only be brought within five years from the passage of
the act, and suits brought to annul patents issued after the passage of the act could
be brought within six years. 5
By this holding, the patentees acquired a general title which could be severed
into mineral and surface estates at the discretion of the title holder.6 If such a
severance was made by the railroad, the general rules of real property control the
subsequent devolution of the estates.7 However, much of the land acquired by
the railroads under the faulty patents was conveyed prior to the Burke decision.
Since the patentee regarded itself as the holder of only the surface estate and coal
and iron, it made no attempt to reserve or except the remaining minerals from
the operation of the conveyances, and the deed conveyed the patentee's entire
interest in the land to the grantee.8 The grantee accordingly acquired the general
title of his grantor. 9 At this point the patentee railroads could possibly have maintained an action to rescind the transaction on the ground of mutual mistake of
fact. The prospects of a favorable judgment in such an action are dubious at best,
since many courts have held that the fact that the subject matter of a contract
possessed qualities which the parties did not believe it to possess is ordinarily immaterial and insufficient to warrant rescission. 10 The patentee would have more
readily obtained relief in equity. The requirements for equitable relief are generally held to be that there exist a mutual and material mistake of fact, not induced by the negligence of either party, with each party having equal opportunity
to acquire information regarding the subject matter.11 The party seeking to avoid
a contract or secure equitable relief must act within a reasonable time after
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid.
Id. at 909.
Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128 (1854).
29 Stat. 42 (1896), 43 U. S. C. A. 900 (1928).
Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. St. 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760 (1858).
Id. at 761.
Kimbley v. Luckey, 72 Okla. 217, 179 Pac. 928 (1919).
Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, 18 Sup. Ct. 632, 42 L. Ed. 1050 (1898).
Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N. W. 42, 54 Am. Rep. 610 (1885).
Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798 (1876).
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knowledge of the mistake is obtained. 12 If the patentee failed to attempt any
such recovery procedure or attempted unsuccessfully, the grantee retained the
general title which he acquired originally. Accordingly, he could sever the estate
at his descretion. 13
If the patentee's grantee conveyed the land without severance, and many did
so prior to the Burke decision, the general estate passed by the deed just as in the
case of the conveyance executed by the railroad. Again the possibilities of legal or
equitable litigation would arise. This relief would be available only where there
had been no intervening conveyance of legal title to a purchaser for value without
notice, since a transfer to a bona fide purchaser cuts off any equitable right arising
as a result of the mistake.14 Thus the patentee could no longer seek a remedy
under the contract conveying the land to its grantee once that grantee had deeded
the land to a bona fide purchaser.
A problem arises where there is an ambiguity in the conveyance of the land
by the patentee or by an intermediate grantor possessing the general title, as in
deeds containing the clause: "Subject to reservations and restrictions in deeds to
said lands made in U. S. Patent ...... ", and referring back to the original patent
issued to the railroad. If the ambiguous clause is interpreted to reserve the minerals in the grantor, a severance is effected and the grantee acquires only a surface
estate. If the clause does not have the effect of reserving or excepting the minerals,
there is no severance and the grantee holds a general estate, subject, however, to
the earlier described possibility of litigation for rescission or reformation.
The determination of the effect of the "subject to" clause in the deed must
be by application of the general rules of contract construction and interpretation.15
Emphasis is directed primarily to the intention of the parties, particularly to the
intent of the grantor in including the ambiguous clause.1 6 It may be argued that
the grantor was not cognizant of the invalidity of the attempted reservation in the
patent and intended the clause to support the warranty of title extended with the
conveyance of the land only as a protective measure to avoid litigation with his
grantee as to the extent of the estate conveyed. It is apparent that this is the
probable explanation where the deed was executed before the patent reservation
was declared void. If the clause is so interpreted, to be merely protective, no
severance is effected and the 'grantee acquires a general estate. However, the
grantor may contend that the "subject to" clause was an ambiguous clause
for language intended to retain any mineral rights arising out of the patent.
This argument could be more logically made if the deed were executed after the
Burke decision than before. As an alternative argument, the grantor may contend
that the "subject to" clause was not intended to reserve any mineral rights to him
but was inserted to limit the estate conveyed to the grantee to that estate which
the grantor thought he owned at the time the property was transferred. There12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid.
Caldwell v. Fulton, supra note 6.
Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 585, 28 N. E. 228 (1891).
Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W. 1044 (1924).
Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 Pac. 468, L. R. A. 1918A 487
(1917).

NOTEs
fore, even though it did not reserve or except the minerals for the grantor's express benefit, it did restrict the estate passed to the grantee to that intended by the
grantor, a surface estate only. This argument has been raised under similar circumstances and dismissed as erroneous with the opinion that a warranty deed reciting that all minerals were sold out of the described tract before acquisition by the
grantor and that all minerals were therefore excluded from the conveyance
operated to convey all the grantor's rights and title to the tract in the absence of
express reservation to the grantor; and, the mineral estate held by the grantor
without his knowledge at the time he conveyed passed to the grantee despite the
recitation. 17 This logic stresses the grantor's intent to pass not just the estate
which he thought he could pass but as great an estate as he actually could. Since
the deed was intended to pass the grantor's entire interest, and that interest was a
general estate, the grantee acquired a general estate.
In ascertaining the effect of an ambiguous deed, the construction placed upon
it in practical conduct by the parties is an indication of their intention. 18 Acts
and declarations of the parties prior and subsequent to the transfer may be resorted
to as indicia of the construction intended.1 9 If the grantor allowed a considerable
period of time to pass without asserting or attempting to assert any dominion over
the minerals, that fact may be weighed as evidencing an absence of any intent on
his part to retain an interest in the minerals by virtue of the ambiguous clause.
It is a general rule of deed construction that the interpretation of an ambiguous
conveyance which cannot be clarified by application of other rules of analysis may
be resolved by, the adoption of that method of construction which favors the
grantee as against the grantor on the theory that the latter selected the terminology
used in the instrument and is therefore chargeable with responsibility for its deficiencies.20 As is indicated however, this rule is adopted only as a last resort, and
it may not be relied upon as the exclusive determining factor in litigation which
may arise in this situation. 2 1 If the facts of the individual case are such that the
ambiguous deed is construed as the grantor contends, to retain the mineral estate,
then a severance is effected and the grantee acquires only the surface estate.
Landowners in Wyoming who are ultimate grantees of lands included in
the federal patents to the railroads issued prior to December 10, 1903 have these
problems and possibilities to be resolved before the exact status of their ownership
may be finally determined. The ambiguity does not include coal and iron lands
since the original void "excluding and excepting" clause expressly renounced any
application to these lands, and subsequent grantees were not misled as to their
ownership of them. The present landowner may draw these conclusions upon
examination of his abstract. First, if there is a recorded express severance of the
mineral estate to the benefit of the severing grantor, the ultimate grantee acquired
only the surface estate and any unsevered minerals if the severance was partial
17. Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. Herrick, 3 So. (2d) 449 (La. App. 1941);
Criticized, 16 Tul. L. R. 151 (1941).
18. Mansfield v. Place, 93 Mich. 450, 53 N. W. 617, 18 L. R. A. 39 (1892).
19. Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. 14, 8 Am. Dec. 287 (N. Y. 1819).
20. Douglass v. Lewis, 131 U. S. 75, 9 Sup. Ct. 634, 33 L. Ed. 53 (1889).
21. Smith v. Furbish, 68 N. H. 123, 44 At. 398, 47 L. R. A. 226 (1894).
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rather than total. 22 Second, if there is a deed in the chain of title which is ambiguous in terminology or effect, the grantor of the deed may seek to establish a
severance by judicial resolution of the ambiguity. Third, if there are no reservations, exclusions, or ambiguities, or if any ambiguity has been or may be resolved
to effect no severance, the ultimate grantee acquired a general estate but his
immediate grantor has a possible equitable action to rescind or reform the deed
on the ground of mutual mistake.
JAMES R. LEARNED

PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE As AFFECTING SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF ACTION

With the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,i the use of
a pre-trial practice has gained in popularity in both State and Federal courts.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules sets out the operation of the pre-trial procedure in
the Federal Courts.2 Practically all states which have adopted a pre-trial system
since the Federal Rules have regulations similar to or copied from Rule 16. In the
interpretation of the effect of the pre-trial procedure, the weight of judicial
authority comes from Massachusetts and Michigan, where such a proceeding has
been in effect with great success since the middle thirties in Suffolk and Wayne
counties respectively. The purposes of the pre-trial procedure have been held to
be a simplication of the issues and a cutting away, by agreement and admission
of the parties, all encumbrances to a speedy trial.3
Rule 16 leaves the techniques of pre-trial formulation of issues up to the
discretion of the individual judge. The usual procedure, however, is briefly dis22. 2 Wyo. L. J. 63 (1948).
sec. 723c.
1. 28 U. S. C. A. foll.
2. "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The siplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to
be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties
as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all
actions."

3. Geopulos v. Mandes, 35 F. Supp. 276 (Dist. Col. 1941); Yale Transport Corp. v.
Yellow Truck & Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F. R. D. 440 (S.D. N. Y. 1944); Kearney v.
Glenn, 1 F. R. D. 203 (W. D. Ky. 1940); Glaspell v. Davis et al, 2 F. R. D. 301
(D. Ore. 1942) ; Eisman et al v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. et al, 30 F. Supp. 436 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939).

